

Efficient 3-Party Distributed ORAM

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Overview

- Background
 - ORAM
 - Distributed ORAM (DORAM)
 - FSS/DPF
 - Our Results
- 3-Party DPF Construction
- 3-Party DORAM Construction
- Future Directions

Our Results

1. 3-Party DPF protocol


- Secure against two semi-honest corruptions
- $O(\sqrt{N})$ communication/computation
- Matches asymptotic complexity of [GI14,BGI15,BGI16]:
 - Concrete efficiency gains
 - Simpler protocol (easier to use, extend/modify)

2. 3-Party DORAM protocol

- Secure against one semi-honest corruption
- $O(\sqrt{N})$ communication, $O(N)$ computation per operation
- Concrete efficiency [DS17]
 - Black-box use of crypto primitives
 - Small constants
 - $O(N)$ operations local and fast (XOR)

Background: Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [GO96]

- Client
- Memory
- List of Instructions
- Security (Obliviousness):
 - Read: Server does not learn position i
 - Write: Server does not learn position i nor write value v
 - Repetition
 - Timing Attacks
 - Op: Server Cannot distinguish between Read vs. Write
 - Server learns an Op was performed
 - No security required for Client





Background: Oblivious RAM (ORAM)

- ORAM via PIR/PIW



Read(i_1)





Background: Oblivious RAM (ORAM)

- ORAM via PIR/PIW
- Security
 - PIR: Server does not learn i
 - PIW: Server does not learn (i, v)



Write(i, v)





Background: Distributed ORAM (DORAM)

- In some settings, security against *Client* is required
 - Operation being performed (Read, Write)
 - Read/Write position and value
- Client is *distributed*: above information is secret shared amongst n parties
 - DORAM \neq Multi-Server ORAM [LO14]
- Motivating Example: MPC (RAM model of computation)
- As with ORAM, distributed Client (and Server) learn number of Operations

Background: Distributed ORAM (DORAM)


- Using MPC to simulate Client, generic transformation ORAM → DORAM [OS97]
 - Generic MPC expensive (often the bottleneck):
 - Attempt to minimize Client complexity in the computation
 - Search for tailored DORAM solutions (black-box only): [GKK+12, FJK+15, DS17, JW18]
- Superior asymptotic complexity ⇒ faster
 - Hidden constants, system capabilities/bottlenecks (memory, power, bandwidth/latency)
 - Survey of [DS17]

Background: Function Secret Sharing [GI15]



Background: Function Secret Sharing

- Consists of Dealer and N-Parties, and three protocols:
 - $\text{Gen}(\lambda, f)$: Dealer gives “keys” to each party
 - $\text{Eval}(k_{\mathcal{P}}, x)$: Party \mathcal{P} uses Gen key $k_{\mathcal{P}}$ to compute their share of $f(x)$
 - $\text{Reconstruct}(\{\text{Eval}(k_{\mathcal{P}})\})$: Combines all parties’ output shares to form $f(x)$
- Known FSS constructions for certain classes of functions
 - Distributed Point Function (DPF) [GI15,BGI16,BGI17]
 - Step-Functions, Intervals



Background: Function Secret Sharing

- FSS (DPF) \implies PIR [CGK+95]




DPF($j, 1$)



($a_1, a_2, \dots, a_i, \dots, a_n$)


($0, 0, \dots, 1, \dots, 0$)

($b_1, b_2, \dots, b_i, \dots, b_n$)



Background: Function Secret Sharing

- FSS (DPF) \implies PIR
- FSS (DPF) \implies PIW [OS97]



Background: Function Secret Sharing

- FSS (DPF) \implies PIR
- FSS (DPF) \implies PIW
- Notes:
 - Server/Databases are different (replicated vs. distinct)
 - Low communication
 - High (linear) server computation, but...
 - All computations are cheap (XOR)
 - Small constants

Our Results

1. 3-Party DPF protocol

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Overview

- Background
- **3-Party DPF Construction**
 - Why $N = 3$?
 - Previous Work
 - Our Results
- 3-Party DORAM Construction
- Future Directions

3-Party DPF Construction: Why N=3?

- In some scenarios, number of parties is tunable (so pick optimal)

#Parties	PROS	CONS
2	2-Party FSS has minimal communication	For ORAM: How to reconcile PIR vs. PIW? For DORAM: How to <i>distribute</i> Client?
3	For ORAM: Easy to reconcile PIR vs PIW For DORAM: Black-box Client <i>distribution</i>	Best known communication is $\Omega(\sqrt{N})$
4	For ORAM: Easy to reconcile PIR vs PIW	For DORAM: How to <i>distribute</i> Client?

3-Party DPF Construction: Why N=3?

- In some scenarios, number of parties is tunable (so pick optimal)


#Parties	PROS	CONS
2	2-Party FSS has minimal communication	For ORAM: How to For DORAM: How to distribute
3	For ORAM: Easy to reconcile PIR vs PIW For DORAM: Black-box Client <i>distribution</i>	Best known communication is $\Omega(\sqrt{N})$
4	For ORAM: Easy to reconcile PIR vs PIW	For DORAM: How to <i>distribute</i> Client?

All FSS-based constructions have linear computation, so \sqrt{N} communication not bottleneck

3-Party DPF Construction: Our Results

- 3-Party DPF(i, v)

- Warm-Up: Linear Solution
Pick (N/λ) keys of length λ :



- $j \neq i$: keys overlap:

$$0 = (a_j + b_j) + (b_j + c_j) + (c_j + a_j)$$

- $j = i$: keys add to v :

$$v = (a_i + d_i) + (b_i + d_i) + (c_i + d_i)$$

- 2-out-of-3 Security:

For any two players, in all positions j (including $j = i$ and $j \neq i$), exactly one key matches

3-Party DPF Construction: Our Results

- 3-Party DPF(i, v)

- Actual Solution:


Pick \sqrt{N} PRG seeds of length λ :

- $j \neq i$: keys overlap:

$(a_j, b_j), (b_j, c_j), (c_j, a_j)$

- $j = i$: keys don't overlap:

$(a_i, d_i), (b_i, d_i), (c_i, d_i)$



- Hiccup: Cannot choose seeds:

$$v = G(a_i) + G(b_i) + G(c_i) + G(d_i)$$

Solution: Deal CW:

$$v + G(a_i) + G(b_i) + G(c_i) + G(d_i)$$

- Why \sqrt{N} ?

Overview

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- **3-Party DORAM Construction**
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3-Party DORAM Construction

- DPF \implies ORAM: Straightforward (via PIR+PIW)
- DPF \implies DORAM: Expensive if using generic MPC reduction
- Recall our 3-Party DPF Construction:
Generate seeds:
Off-Block: $\{a_i, b_i\}, \{b_i, c_i\}, \{c_i, a_i\}$
On-Block: $\{a_i, d_i\}, \{b_i, d_i\}, \{c_i, d_i\}$
Because seeds are random (just need to satisfy overlapping property),
they are easy to generate with black-box crypto (OT)

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- **Future Directions**

Future Directions

- 3-Party FSS (DPF): Can beat \sqrt{N} communication?
- 3-Party DORAM: Implement and Benchmark
 - Extend feasible parameter regime?
 - Parameter regime where our protocol is superior?
- 3-Party DORAM: Feasibility/Benchmarking for all parameter regimes
 - Mix-and-match
 - Generic DORAM backend for MPC (RAM model)

Thank You!
